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A VIEW OF THE PAROL-EVIDENCE RULE.*-
PART I.
§ i. Parol Evidence Rule not a Rule of Evidence. An un-
fortunate employment of a terminology in which the subject
cannot possibly be discussed with accuracy and lucidity, a
lack of systematic treatment in its proper department and sur-
roundings, and an inherent necessity for certain distinctions
which are simple in themselves but are in application to indi-
vidual cases often unavoidably indecisive and difficult to trac
-these considerations alune would suffice to account for the
confusion, the apparent inconsistency, and the discouraging dif-
ficulties that attend the so-called parol-evidence rule and make
it perhaps the most troublesome in the whole field of evidence.
No one can approach the subject, in any attempt to restate its
limitations, except with a sense of temerity; and the following
brief arrangement of the leading topics of the rule is offered
merely in the belief that no new way of stating them can be
more confusing than some of those now to be found, while a
a modc of statement discarding the evidential terminology,
* The following pages were prepared for use in a forthcoming edition
-of Greenleaf on Evidence; they have not been altered for the present
purpose except by the omission of some citations, cross-references and
brief paragraphs.
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and emphasizing certain related doctrines of substantive law,
may make it easier, if not to solve the various problems, at
least to appreciate what is the nature of the problem to be
solved.'
(i) It is first to be noticed that the rule or rules concerned
are not rules of evidence. They do not exclude certain data
because those data for one reason or another are untrustworthy
or undesirable means of evidencing something to be proved.
They do not declare that something here is admissible evi-
dence while something there is not. What the rule does is to
forbid a certain thing to be proved at all, and this, of course,
is in effect to declare that the thing is legally immaterial for
some reason of substantive law. When a thing is not to be
proved at all, the rule of prohibition is not a rule of evidence,
even though the words "proof" or " evidence" are employed
in stating the prohibition ; just as, on a plea of self-defence to
an action for battery, if we say that no evidence of the plain-
tiff's insulting words will be admitted, we mean that his words
are no excuse for the battery. If, then, we dismiss once for
all any notion that the parol-evidence rule is concerned with
any doubts or precautions or limitations based on the nature
of certain evidentiary matter, or indeed with any regulation
about evidence, we shall have taken the first step to a clearer
understanding of the working of the rule.
(2) It is next to be noted that the thing that is to be ex-
cluded as immaterial by the rule is not particularly anything
that can clearly be described as "parol." Without attempting
to discriminate the various possible senses of this word, it will
be enough to note that, so far as it conveys the impression
that what is excluded is excluded because it is oral-because
somebody spoke or did something not in ivriting, or is now
offering to testify orally,--this impression is not the correct
one. Where the rule is applicable, what is excluded may be
written material as well as conversations, circumstances, and
oral matter in general; and where the rule is applicable so
I For an acute analysis and historical examination of the whole sub-
ject, see ch. io in Professor Thayer's "Preliminary Treatise on the Law
of Evidence."
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as to exclude certain written material, nevertheless certain
oral material may properly be considered. So that the term
"parol" affords no necessary clue to the 'kind of material ex-
cluded; and it conduces to the intelligent use of the rule to
dismiss any notion that oral or parol matters are inherently
the object of its prohibition.
(5) Again, within the scope of the rule are usually treated
two distinct bodies of doctrine, which do not properly touch
each other, except in certain relations at certain points. One
of these concerns the constitution of legal acts, the other con-
cerns their interpretation; and the difficulties of principle and
lines of precedents for these two subjects are as a whole en-
tirely distinct, and cannot properly be subsumed under any
single generalization or rule.
In short, then, the "parol-evidence rule" does not concern
doctrines of evidence; nor is it to be tested by the oral nature
of the fact to be proved; nor is there any one rule on the
subject.
§ 2. Constution and Interpretation of Legal Acts; Parol-
Evidence Rue. A person's conduct is one of the chief sources
of any changes that occur in his legal relations. The creation,
transfer, and extinction of a right and of an obligation are
made in great part to depend upon specified kinds of conduct
on his part. This conduct, regarded as having legal conse-
quences of the above sort, may be spoken of, in individual in-
stances, as a legal act.' The terms or nature of the act vary,
of cotiise, according to the nature of the right or the obliga-
tion aimed at-a contract, a sale, a Will, a notice, and so on;
the substantive law specifies these termis apptopriately in the
various instances, and the various branches of the substantive
law dre to be sought for these essential terms of the conduct
required to constitute an effective act
Now the cbnduct which may go to make up the terms of a
I The true point of view has thus been obscured by our traditional
handling of the subject in terms of evidence. The German discussions
of the general subject, while of no service in elucidating bur special
problems, take a better standpoint for discussion ; a profitable work is
"Der Irrthum bei nichtigen Vertragen," by Rudolph Leonhard, Dumm-
lers, Berlin, 1892.
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legal act may normally be spread over various times and con-
tained in various materials-as where a contract to sell goods
may have to be gathered from conversations, letters, tele-
grams, price-lists, and other data. If there were no such rule
as the "parol-evidence" rule, such would always be the
various data in which would be sought the terms of the act.
Conceivably, and frequently, they would not be found in a
single utterance or a single writing, nor in writings nor utter-
ances made at one time. But there is a doctrine, founded on
sound policy and experience, which imposes restrictions upon
the sort of data that are to be considered as effectively supply-
ing the terms of a legal act. The restrictions thus imposed
affect both time and material; i. e. they may require the terms
of the act to be sought in the utterances or conduct of one
occasion (forbidding a range over preceding occasions of the
same negotiation); and they may require the terms to be con-
tained in a special mode of expression, i. e., writing or its
equivalent (excluding the use of oral utterances).1 Usually
the two sorts of restriction are combined, i. e., the terms of the
act are to be sought in a single writing made at one time.
When do such restrictions become applicable, so as to have
this effect of giving legal standing and validity to a single
writing only, and of forbidding the consideration of all other
conduct as supplying the terms of the legal act? The re-
strictions may become applicable in two kinds of situations:
(I) where a specific rule of law provides that the act, to be
effective legally, must be contained in a single writing, as
where a will or a deed is required to be in writing; (2) where
the parties to the act have by intention made a single writing
the sole memorial and repository of its terms,-as where the
parties to a contract finally, after sundry negotiations, embody
in a single writing the terms agreed upon. This process of
reducing the act's terms to a single memorial, whether by re-
1 It may be noted that, as Mr. J. Blackburn has acutely pointed out
(when arguing as counsel in Brown v. Byrue, 3 r. & B. 703), the parol-
evidence rule might conceivably apply even to an oral utterance consti-
tuting the final fixing of the terms, thus excluding other oral utterances;
so also Gilbert v. McGinnis, 114 Ml. 28; but practically this possibility
need not be considered.
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quirement of law or by intention of the parties, may be, for
convenience of discussion, termed Integration, i. c., the con-
stitution of the whole in a single memorial.
This principle is well established and unquestioned in the
law. The difficulties that arise are concerned with the scope
of its application. The effect of the principle is an exclu-
sionary one, i. e., to reject from consideration, as having no
legal standing and effect, data of conduct other than the sole
written memorial. The matter thus excluded has come to be
termed "parol evidence," although, as already pointed out, it
is not evidence and not necessarily in parol. As the question
usually comes up in a court, a writing is received from one
party; and then matter other than this writing, and tending
to overturn its legal effect, is offered by the other party, and is
objected to by the first party by virtue of the present princi-
ple. The inquiry is thus presented whether the data thus
offered in opposition are obnoxious to this rule of Integration.
In other words, granting that there is a writing by the party
or parties, is this sufficient to exclude the opposing data?
Does the mere fact of the writing have that effect? Are
there not many cases in which such data, although affecting
the writing in the interest of the opponent, are nevertheless
receivable without being obnoxious to the Integration rule ?
Unquestionably there are such cases; but the difficulty is to
draw the line consistently and to expound the reasons soundly
and systematically. The great mass of the rulings upon the
parol-evidence rule are concerned with the attempt to draw
this line and define these situations. The various cases in
which such data are receivable seem to fall under the following
heads
I. (I) It may always be shown that no legal act at all has
ever been consummated or that some defence or excuse exists
which overturns or sets aside an act conceded to have been
done. (a) Under the first of these heads, there are certain
constantly recurring situations, depending somewhat for their
solution upon the particular department of law (contracts,
wills, etc.), yet capable of being discussed in general terms
applicabie to all legal acts. They concern the will or con-
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scious volition of the person in setting his hand to the act;
and the question is whether he has after all consummated any
legal act at all or an act of the alleged tenor, i.e. whether it
is to be treated as his act (that is,. an act having the supposed
legal consequences) if he has merely drafted its terms but not
finally willed to execute it, or if he has done it with the under-
standing that it is to be only morally binding, or if he has done
it subject to another's approval, or if he has signed a writing
without reading it over, and the like. (b) The second of these
heads deals with the effect of some accompanying circum-
stance as making the act, though consummated and intrinsic-
ally effective, potentially avoidable, i. e. subject to some defence
or excuse which will enable the actor to repudiate it or set it
aside or successfully defend against the consequences, e. g.
whether fraud, or an agreement to hold in trust or for security,
will avail for this purpose. Thus, these two kinds of situa-
tions allow a consideration of all data by which it appears, as
a rule of substantive law (a) that no legal act has been con-
summated at all, or (b) that the act, though consummaited, is
subject to avoidance upon grounds justifying such a defence.
(2) Independently of the preceding, it is further true that
the Integration rule, excluding other data, does not apply
unless there has been integration. Consequently, such ex-
trinsic data may always be considered (a) where there has not
been, by intention of the parties, any integration at all, or (a')
only a partial integration, not extending to the matters in
question; and (b) where the law does not specifically require
an integration in writing.
II. Furthermore, a legal act existing, it has constantly to
be interpreted in order to be made effective; for, since its
terms will be found chiefly in words, and *ince words are
merely symbols indicating external objects as to which the
right or duty is predicated, the connection between these sym-
bols and all possible objects must be ascertained in order to
carry the terms into effects corresponding with their signifi-
cance as predetermined by the party or parties to the act. In
this process of Interpretation, various data have to be consid-
ered; and there may be rules of guidance for choosing or
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ascertaining the proper meaning; a new series of questions
arise, peculiar to this subject: but the general process of using
the interpreting data is not obnoxious to the Integration rule.
These several subjects may now be examined in more
detail.
§ 3. (I) Constitution of Legal Acts; (i) Whether an Act has
been Consummated at all. Only a small part of conduct is
legal conduct, i. e. conduct intended to have legal effectiveness.
The same conduct may under varying circumstances be in-
tended to have other sorts of consequences than a legal one
or the particular legal one,--as where a person hands a parcel
to another, or writes a letter; and the distinction will often
turn entirely on the accompanying intent. In other words,
whether an act of an alleged tenor has been consummated
will often depend chiefly on. whether an intention to do an act
of that tenor accompanied the conduct in question. At the
same time, since for reasons of policy designed to protect
others in their dealings against undisclosed and undiscoverable
defects in their rights, there may be cases in which the doing
of the conduct itself, irrespective of the intention, must be
taken as finally consummating the act. Thus the problem is
to define these situations in which the effectiveness or validity
of the act is to depend merely on its doing and apart from its
intention. Put in the shape of a rule of exclusion, the ques-
tion becomes: When may it not be shown that the intention
of the actor was not to do an act of the sort apparently done?
Observing that this is distinctly a question of substantive law
determining the existence of rights and duties, and that the
solution may well be different in different parts of the law, we
may notice briefly the various types of situation. The alleged
incompleteness of the act may be attributed to the circum-
stance (a) that the act was intended to have no legal signifi-
cance at all, but only a moral or social one; or (b) that the
act was provisional or preparatory only, and never finally
willed as a consummated act; or (c) that though a legal act
of some sort was intended, yet it was not this legal act, but
an act of some other tenor, either wholly or in part.
(a) This variety of situation, while common enough, seldom
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gives rise to legal controversy. An invitation to dine, ex-
tended to a friend, illustrates it, and is to be contrasted with
the promise of a restaurateur to furnish a meal. An instance
of a different sort is found in Earl v. Rice,' where it was allowed
to be shown that an agreement, signed by husband and wife,
as to the sale of her lands and the disposition of the proceeds
for the benefit of the children, was understood between them
to be only morally binding. In this aspect, the "parol-evi-
dence rule" may be stated somewhat thus, namely, that con-
duct apparently having the form of a legal act may always be
shown to have been done with the intent to assume only moral
or social consequences. 2
(b) This variety of situation gives rise to constant -legal
controversy, chiefly because it is often difficult to distinguish
practically between such a total absence of effective intent as
to leave the act merely inchoate and such a partial modifica-
tion of the effect of a consummated act as concedes the con-
summation but violates the principle of Integration by- im-
properly setting up a competing agreement to modify the
integrated act. An instance of the less difficult sort is the
writing of a draft promissory note for possible use, where the
lack of intent to consummate a note leaves the writing without
final legal significance. Again, in Nichfol v. Nicholls, it was
allowed to be shown that a paper purporting to be a will was
written during a friendly conversation, in the course of which
the writer put certain words on a paper, and said "That is as
good a will as I shall probably ever make ;" these words indi-
cating possibly that the writing was intended merely as an
experiment or suggestion. Instances of the more difficult
sort are cases of contract-writings drawn up in complete detail
and signed, but agreed not to be regarded as binding and con-
summated until the happening of some condition precedent.
Thus, it may be shown that an agreement, though signed, was
understood not to be a binding act until the signature of
1 iii Mass. 17.
2See Gunz v. Giegling, io8 Mich. 295; Church v. Case, zuo id. 621;
Grand Isle v. Kinney (Vt.), 41 AtI. 130.
3Prerog. Ct., Ann. Reg. 1814, p. 278.
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another party was obtained,' or until the approval or consent
of a third person should be obtained,' or that some other act
should be done by a party or a third person On the other
hand, an understanding which concedes that an effective legal
act has been consummated but purports to affect the terms of
the obligation, by limiting the conditions of default or speci-
fying events on which it shall by condition subsequent cease
to be binding, does not come within the above notion, and is
excluded because it comes in competition with the terms of
the writen act under the principle of § 5, Pst; thus, an under-
standing that a note is to be payable out of certain funds
only,4 or that its payment will not be enforced at all,' or only
upon certain conditions, would not be considered! Under
the present head seems also to belong the class of cases in
which it is desired to show that the person attempted to be
charged as a party to a document did not sign as a part but
only as a witness; this may be shown, because it means that
as to that person there was no legal act
1 Pattle v. Hornbrook, 1897, I Ch. 25'; State v. Wallis, 57 Ark. 64;
Robertson v. Rowell, 158 Mass. 94; Kelly v. Oliver, 1 3 N. C. 442; Mfrs.
Furn. Co. v. Kremer, 7 S. D. 463; McCormick Co. v. Faulkner, ib. 363;
Gillman v. Gross, 97 Wis. 224; see Beard v. Boylan, 59 Conn. 2S.
2 Cleveland Ref. Co. v. Dunning (Mich.), 73 N. W. 339; Tug R. C. & S.
Co. v. Brigel, U. S. App., 86 Fed. 818; Pym v. Campbell, 6 R. & B. 370.
3 Blewitt v. Boorum, 142 N. Y. 357; Curry v. Colburn (Wis.), 74 N.
W. 778.
'Stein v. Fogarty (Ida.), 43 Pac. 681; Mumford v. Tolman, x57 Ill.
258; Gorrell v. Ins. Co., 24 U. S. App. 188; contra: Clinch Co. v. Will-
ing, i8o Pa. z65.
5 First Nat'l B'k v. Foote, 12 Utah, 157; Bryan v. Duff, 12 Wash. 233.
'Van Syckel v. Dalrymple, 32 N.J. Eq. 233; Northern Trust Co. v.
Hiltgen, 62 Minn. 361; Van Etten v. Howell, 40 Nebr. 850; Wilson v.
Wilson, 26 Or. 251; Shea v. Leisy, 85 Fed. 243; Nebr. Expos. Ass'n v.
Townley, 46 Nebr. 893; Taylor v. Hunt, x8 N. C. 168; Murchie v. Peck,
z6o Ill. 175.
7 For other instances illustrating the above distinctions, see Guidery v.
Green, 95 Cal. 63o; Ryan v. Cooke, 172 Ill. 302; Hanck v. Wright (Miss.),
23 So. 422; Western Mfg. Co. v. Rogers (Nebr.), 74 N. W. 849; Ellison
v. Gray, N. J. L., 37 At. ioiS; Lowenfeld v. Curtis, U. S. App., 72 Fed.
io3. Needless to say, the application of the distinctions in a given in-
stance may offer much room for difference of opinion.
' Garrison v. Owens, i Pinney 473; Isham v. Cooper, N. J. L., 39 At.
76o. In the law of negotiable instruments, several questions of an anal-
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(c) In this situation the execution of some legal act is con-
ceded, but it is desired to show that its purporting terms were,
either wholly or in part, not intended by the party doing the
act. The typical cases are those of one signing a blank piper
afterwards filled out by another without any authority or dif-
ferently from a limited authority; of a blind or illiterate person
signing a document whose contents are, fraudulently or other-
wire, incorrectly stated to him; of an ordinary person signing
a document whose terms he has misread or has not read at
all. Here there is opportunity for much difference of policy,
depending on the nature of the act and the relations of the
parties. In general, it seems fair to insist that, where the in-.
tention was to do a legal act of some sort, the efficient ele-
ment is supplied, and the terms of the specific act intended
should depend solely on the document and not on the unex-
pressed state of mind of the party doing the act; so that a
mistake due to one or the other of the above reasons should
be immaterial. At the same time there are certain situations
in which policy may well allow a relaxation of this rule. In
the first place, it need not be enforced in favor of a party who
by fraud or carelessness has brought about the mistake--as in
the case of one fraudulently misreading a document to an il-
literate person.1 In the next place, it need not be enforced
where the writing is equally fallacious in representing the
terms as understood by the opposing party; in other words,
ogous sort arise, but peculiar considerations apply in that field of the
law; for example, the effect of a parol agreement that an indorsement in
blank or in full shall be without recourse against the indorser; of an
agreement that an indorsing payee is to be treated as guarantor, co-surety,
or joint maker ; of an agreement that joint makers or maker and indorser,
or indorser and indorsee, are to be treated between .themselves as sae-
ties. In the law of agency, also, some special questions arise, governed
by more or less peculiar considerations; for example, the effect of an
agreement that a person signing a contract is to be treated as agent only,
or that a person signing as agent is to be treated as also a principal; and
the doctrine of undisclosed principal.
'See Harriman on Contracts, 35: Thoroughgood's Case, 2 Co. Rep.
9 b; Foster v. Mackinnon, L. R. 4 C. P. 704; O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145
Mass. 461 ; Wanner v. Landis, 137 Pa. 61 ; Bank v. Webb, xo8 Ala. 132 ;
Yock v. Ins. Co., ii Cal. 503; Green v. Wilkie, 98 Ia. 74; Coates v.
Early, 46 S. C. 220; Hartford L. I. Co. v. Gray, 8o Il. 28.
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in the case of mutual mistake, where in Chancery the reforma-
tion of the instrument is allowed.' In the third place, a tes-
tator signing a will is not in the position of one on the faith
of whose act another party to the transaction may be misled,
and thus there may be less objection than in the case of con-
tracts to permitting the testator's ignorance of the contents,
through misreading or otherwise, to be shown.2 But all these
questions are here seen, more clearly perhaps than in other
parts of the subject, to be in truth questions in the various de-
partments of substantive law concerned with the different
kinds of legal acts; and broad and varying considerations of
policy are concerned, into which it is not necessary here to
enter.
§ 4. Same: (2) Whether a Defence or Excuse Exists, Ren-
dering the Act Voidable. Assuming that a legal act has been
done, it may be desired to show that some defence or excuse
exists, by reason of which the act is voidable and may be re-
pudiated. There is here no attempt to alter the terms of the
act; it is conceded, and its terms are conceded; but an inde-
pendent defence is set up. Whether this defence may be
shown depends merely on whether the policy of the substan-
tive lav applicable to that class of acts recognizes the circum-
stance as rendering the act voidable and constituting a defence
to its enforcement. The clearest case of this sort is that of
fraud. The substantive law concerned determines when fraud
is to be'regarded as a defence, and what circumstances are to
be regarded as amounting to fraud. But there is no objection
to the showing of fraud from the present point of view, i. e.
the constitution and integration of legal acts, because no effort
is made to resort to other than the integrated act for ascer-
taining its terms; the terms are conceded to be represented by
the writing only, and the object is to set up independent cir-
See Wilcox v. Lucas, 121 Mass. 22; Bush v. Hicks, 60 N. Y. 298;
Andrews v. Andrews, 8 Me. 337; Stockbridge Co. v. Hudson Co., 107
Mass. 290.
2 See Guardhouse v. Blackburn, L. R. i P. D. xo9; Fulton v. Andrew,
L. R. 7 H. L. 460; Morrell v. Morrell, L. R. 7 P. D. 68; Stephen, Digest
of Evidence, 4th Ed., App. note 33, and Pref. p. 37; Sheer v,. Sheer, 159
Ill. 59r.
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cumstances rendering the act voidable.' A showing of duress
also, wherever the substantive law recognizes it as an available
defence, is equally unobjectionable from the present point of
view. Possibly the proceeding for reformation on the ground
of mutual mistake may be regarded as properly belonging
under the present head. The more difficult case is that of an
accompanying agreement to hold property as trustee or to
hold it as security only. It may be suggested that the title to
property can be regarded as capable of separation into various
qualities or modalities-title as both beneficial and legal owner,
title as legal owner only (with the beneficial interest in another),
and title as security holder only (with the redemption interest
in another). The simple transfer of ownership will in all. cases*
transfer the bare legal title, but it may or may not carry with
it the beneficial interest of the second or third sort. The
title being thus separable into distinct elements, it is easy to
regard the act of separating and retaining (by mutual under-
standing) the beneficial interest of the second or third, sort as
an independent circumstance which may be availed of to cut
down the apparent interest of the title-holder, by way of de-
fence or avoidance. Thus, where the circumstances are such
as to justify, by the substantive law, the recognition of a re-
sulting trust, there is no objection from the present point of
view; and it may be shown just as fraud could be shown.'
So also a retention of the redemption interest in the transferor,
with the effect of giving the transferee a security title only,
may be shown, as an independent circumstance constituting a
defence to his apparent right to claim full and beneficial title.'
But in the latter case it may happen that the act of transfer
clearly purports to give not merely the bare legal title, an ele-
£ State v. Cass, 52 N. J. L. 77.
2 So also for infancy or other legal incapacity to act.
3 Felz v. Walker, 49 Conn. 93.
Campbell v. Dearborn, 107 Mass. 3o; Barry v. Colville, 129 N. Y.
3o2; Hieronymus v. Glass (Ala.), 23 So. 674; Ahern v. McCarthy, o7
Cal. 382; Shad v. Livingston, 3 r Fla. 89; German Ins. Co. v. Gibe, 162
II1. 25 1 ; Bever v. Bever, i44 Ind. 157; Libby v. Clark, 88 Me. 32 ; Dixon
v. Ins. Co., x68 Mass. 48; Pinch v. Willard, xo8 Mich. 204; Vanderhoven
v. Romaine, N. J. Eq. 39 AUt. 129; Voorhies v. Hennessy, 7 Wash. 243
Shank z,. Groff, 43 W. Va. 337; Gettelman v. Assur. Co., 97 Wis. 237.
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ment common to all transfers of title, but also the full bene-
ficial interest, free from any redemption interest; and where
this is the case, all the possible elements of a title being ac-
counted for and covered, a supposed retention of the redemp-
tion interest can no longer be regarded as a separate act avail-
able in defence, but comes directly in competition with the
terms of the tranfer, and is thus in this instance not available.'
Another sort of independent act which, by setting aside the
original act, substitutes a new one and furnishes a defence to
any claim founded on the avoided one, is a novation ; this may
be shown, whether it involves a novation in the full sense, i. e. a
complete supersession of the original act,2 or merely a change
of some of its terms by subsequent agreement or waiver An
agreement not to sue, or not to sue for a limited time, is per-
haps not to be regarded, at .least apart from equity, as an avail-
able defence;" but an agreement to forbear forever to sue is in
theory equivalent to a promise to give a release, and thus, in
equity at least, is of the nature of a defence which can be set
up in an action on the main contract.5 But it may be difficult,
in specific instances, to determine whether the agreement
should be treated as genuinely one of the above sort or as
merely an agreement limiting liability and thus of an admis-
sible sort; for example, an agreement not to collect more than
a part of the amount of a note may be regarded as not avail-
able," but an agreement to credit a certain counter-claim in
payment may be given effect.7 It may be added that where
the facts to be shown negative the very existence or consum-
I Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133. Occasionally this is laid down as a
general rule, in disregard of the distinction above noted; see Munford v.
Green (Ky.), 44 S. W. 419; Goon Gan v. Richardson, 16 Wash. 373-
2 Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 63o.
3 Goss v. Nugent, 5 B & Ad. 863 ; Smith v. Kelley (Mich.), 73 N. W.
385 ; Harris v. Murphy, z19 N. C. 34; Dunklee v. Goodenough, 68 Vt.
x3; Chic., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dickson, 143 Ill. 368..
SFord v. Beach, ii Q. B. 852; Dow v. Tuttle, 4 Mass. 883. Compare
the case of a contemporaneous agreement to renew: Hoare v. Graham,
3 Campb. 57 ; Ames, Cases on Bills and Notes, II, 124, note.
5 Dean v. Newhall, 8 T. R. 168; Harriman on Contracts, 283.
6 Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 93 Ga. 443.
7 Bennett zo. Tillmon, x8 Mont. 28; contra: Phelps v. Abbott (Mich.),
72 N. W. 3.
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mation of a legal act (as in § 3, ante), they may be shown as
against any assignee of the supposed right created by the act,
because he can obtain nothing if there was nothing to transfer
to him; whereas, if the facts concern merely a defence or
enable a consummated act to be avoided (as in the present
section), the showing will, in some departments of the law,
not be allowed as against a bona fide assignee for value of the
right created by the act.'
§ 5. Integration of Legal Acts by Intent of Parties; (I)
Wh7ether the Act has been Integrated at all. The principle of
Integration-i. e. refusing to recognize, as a part of the act or
as furnishing its terms, anything but the final written memorial
as adopted by the parties-assumes that there has been an
integration into a final written memorial. It is therefore, of
course, always possible to show that a writing offered as such
has never been enacted by the parties as such a memorial, i. e.
that there never has been an integration; and in such case
any negotiations or parts of the transaction whatever may be
considered in order to determine the entire terms of the act.
A mere temporary or preliminary memorandum2 or a series
of letters,3 for example, will usually not be such an exclusive
memorial; though it is always a question as to the intent of
the parties in the particular case. A memorandum made to
satisfy the fourth and seventeenth sections of the Statute of
Frauds is not as such and necessarily the exclusive memorial
of the transaction.' A receipt, acknowledging the payment
of money or delivery of goods, is not as such an exclusive
memorial of the terms of a contract connected with the money
or the goods ; though a document may be at the same time
a receipt and the exclusive memorial of contract;6 whence
I See Dow v. Tuttle, supira; Martin v. Cole, io4 U. S. 30.
2 Ramsbottom v. Turnbridge, 2 M. & S. 434; Doe v. Cartwright, 3 B.
& Ald. 326; R. v. Wrangle, a A. & B. 514; Alien v. Pink, 4 M. & W.
14o; Vaughan v. McCarthy, 63. Minn. 221.
3 Burditt v. Howe, 69 Vt. 563.
4 Browne, Statute of Frauds, cc. 17, 18.
5 Singleton v. Barrett, 2 Cr. & J. 368; Equit. Secur. Co. v. Talbert, 49
La. Ap. 1393; State v. Giese, N.J. L., 36 AUt. 680; Keaton v. Jones, Ui9
N. C. 43.
6 See Ramsdell v. Clark, 20 Mont. o3 ; Jackson v. Bly, 57 Oh. 450;
Allen v. Mill Co., 18 Wash. 216.
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arises the well-known distinction that a bill of lading, as a
receipt for goods, but not as a contract of carriage, may be
shown to be incorrect in its terms.
§ 6. Same: (2) Whether the Part of the Act in Question has
been Integrated. Even though there has been an integration,
i. e. a reduction of a transaction to a final and exclusive written
memorial, yet, since several transactions may be consummated
by the same parties at the same time of negotiation, and since
the parties may integrate one of these transactions and not
another, or may integrate one part of a transaction and not
another part, it is of course always open to show that the
integration was partial only; and in such case the terms of the
remainder, not covered by the written memorial, may be gleaned
from anything said or done by the parties independently of
the writing. Effect is given to the written memorial as exclu-
sively representing the terms of the transaction, but only
because the parties have so intended it, and therefore only so
far the parties have intended it. Since all depends thus on
the parties' intention as to the extent or scope of the integra-
tion, the application of the principle will depend almost en-
tirely on the circumstances of each case,--including the kind
of transaction, the usual terms of such transactions, the scope
of the writing, and the surrounding circumstances of the par-
ticular negotiation No detailed rules can be formulated;
and the working of the principle can best be understood by
noticing its application in particular instances. For example,
where a written lease was given, an oral agreement by the
lessor to destroy rabbits on the leased land was admitted ; 3
where a written lease of a house and the furniture therein was
I The Delaware, 14 Wall. 579; Tallassee V. M. Co. v. P. Co. (Ala.), 23
So. 139; McClain, Cases on Carriers, pp. 233-248; Hutchinson, Carriers,
1 1222ff.
2It is occasionally said (e.g., in Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. L. 332,
whose language has been approved in Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374;
Seitz v. Refrig. Co., 141 U. S. 5to), that the parties' intention as to the
exclusive effect of the document is to be gathered exclusively from the
terms of the document itself; but this is unsound in principle as well as
impossible in practice; the fallacy is repudiated in Bighmie v. Taylor,
98 N. Y. 288, and has little support.
3 Morgan v. Griffith, L. R. 6 Exch. 70.
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made, an oral agreement by the lessor to put in certain furni-
ture was excluded ; where a deed of land abutting on a street
was made, an oral agreement by the vendor to have the street
graded was admitted;' where a deed of similar land was made,
an oral agreement by the vendor to pay for a sewer in the
course of construction was admitted ; ' where a deed of two
houses, with the lease of a hall, was made, an oral agreement
to put hard-pine flooring into the hall was admitted ; where
a deed of land and a store provided that "this grant includes
all the shelving in the building," an agreement to sell person-
alty in the store was admitted ; ' where a written contract was
made to give possession of the promisor's premises for the
purpose of building, an oral agreement to provide certain room
for storage purposes was excluded; 6 where a covenant was
made to furnish a person's support, an agreement that the
promisee would, live at a certain place was excluded; 7 where
a written lease of land was made, an oral agreement by the
lessor to devise the lands to the lessees, on condition that they
improved the premises and paid an annual rent, was admitted;'
where a written agreement was made to board "three per-
sons," an oral agreement specifying the three was excluded.9
Most of these instances are arguable, in the sense that a
contrary decision could not be thought unsupportable; and
in most of them the decisions have depended more or less on
the attendant circumstances. But however arguable the ruling
may be in a particular instance, the general notion is always
the same and is everywhere accepted. The inquiry is, for
each instance anew, Was the subject of the offered agreement
intended by the parties to be covered or disposed of in the
written memorial? If they intended that writing to represent
'Angell v. Duke, 32 L. T. N. S. 320.
2 Durkin v. Cobleigh (Mass.), 3o N. E. 474.
'Carr v. Dooley, ixI Mass. 294.
'Graffam v. Pierce, 143 Mass. 536.
Bretto v. Levine, 5o Minn. i6S.
c Dixon-Woods Co. v. Glass Co., 169 Pa. 167.
Tuttle v. Burgett, 53 Oh. 498.
Harmau z,. Harman, 34 U. S. App. 316.
9Rector v. Bernaschina, 64 Ark. 65o.
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the net re. At of their negotiations on that topic, then no other
matter, whether oral or written, is to be consulted for ascer-
taining the terms of their act.-It is sometimes said that the
test is whether the parol agreement "varies or adds to" the
written memorial, or whether it is "inconsistent" with it.
But these, it is obvious, may be fallacious tests; for, though
an oral agreement which is inconsistent with or varies from
the written memorial will always be ineffective and inad-
missible, it is not true, conversely, that an oral agreement
which is not inconsistent with the written memorial is admis-
sible. Where the parties have clearly intended to cover the
whole of a subject having many possible details, the promisor
may not purport to make an engagement as to one of the pos-
sible details, and thus an oral engagement on that precise
point is not in strictness inconsistent with the written memo-
rial, nor does it vary the latter; yet it may be inadmissible if
the memorial apparently intended to embrace the whole of the
promise on the general subject to which that detail belongs;
for example, a written contract of sale for an engine is in strict-
ness not inconsistent with nor varied by an oral warranty of the
engine's working capacity, if the written memorial does not
refer in any way to the engine's capacity; yet such a warranty
would be by most courts excluded. It seems more accurate
in practice and more correct on principle to avoid such phras-
ings of the test, and to inquire, more broadly, whether the
subject of the offered agreement has been intended to be
wholly disposed of by the written memorial; if so, the agree-
ment is not to be considered, whether it is consistent or incon-
sistent with the memorial's specific terms.
The principle now under consideration finds frequent appli-
cation where it is desired to imply into the contract a custom
or usage which prevails for the class of transactions involved,
and would be regarded, but for the written memorial, as an
implied term of the contract. Ordinarily, parties do not in-
tend to reduce to writing in the memorial all the usages appli-
cable to the class of transactions involved; in other words,
the scope of their intended integration includes only such
matters as may or must vary with the particular transaction,
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and not such matters as are uniformly arranged for by current
usage;' thus, in an order for a large quantity of flour, the
quantity, the quality, the grade of wheat, the consignee, the
time and place of delivery, will naturally vary with the par-
ticular order, and a written memorial of the contract will
therefore have necessarily for its object the reduction to cer-
tainty of these variable particulars; but the mode- of manu-
facturing, the mode of packing, and the mode of marking,
may by local usage be uniform in all cases, and hence there
will usually be no occasion and no intention to deal with these
matters in the written memorial; in other words, there has
been on those points no intended integration; and therefore it
is open to resort to current usage for the implied terms of the
contract on those points. If, however, the writing, by men-
tioning one or another of those points, shows that there has
been an intention to deal with the matter in the written memo-
rial, or if such an intention can be otherwise ascertained, then
the usage cannot be resorted to as furnishing a term of the con-
tract. Usually, then, it may be said, that when the written
memorial contains nothing on the subject of the usage offered,
the usage (if of such a sort as by the law of contracts would
be an implied term of the contract) may be resorted to, in
spite of the existence of the written memorial. Here, how-
ever, as in all other applications of the present principle, the
result will depend chiefly on the circumstances of each case.
John H. W'gmor'e.
Northwestern University Law School,
Chicago.
(To be continued.)
I ,Parties are found to proceed with the tacit assumption o these
usages; they commonly reduce into writing the special particulars of
their agreement, but omit to specify these known usages, which are in-
cluded, however, as of course, by mutual understanding . .. The
contract in truth is partly express and in writing, partly implied or un-
derstood and unwritten:" Coleridge, J., in Brown v. Byrne, 3 B &
B. 703.
